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Judicial Power and American Character is a thought-provok-
ing book that often provokes the wrong thoughts. Robert F. 
Nagel deftly portrays the pathologies of a legal cultureJ that can 
neither endorse in theory nor deny in practice the political nature 
of judicial review. That culture is indicted for failing to examine 
the actual consequences of legal doctrines, engaging in any abu-
sive practice necessary to retain control of the judiciary, holding 
the American people in contempt, and ignoring valued, but inar-
ticulate, political traditions. Nagel makes a strong case for each 
count. Unfortunately, his examples implicitly lay the blame for 
these contemporary judicial vices almost entirely at the door of 
liberal jurists and scholars.4 As a result, rather than further com-
mon efforts to improve the quality of political and legal dis-
course, the rhetoric of Judicial Power may promote complacency 
on the right and recriminations on the left. Moreover, by identi-
fying, often correctly, the defects of only one side to a political 
struggle, Nagel overlooks the ways in which questionable liberal 
1. Ira Rothgerber, Jr., Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Colorado. 
2. Associate Professor of Government, University of Maryland. 
3. Although entitled Judicial Power and American Character, the main body of 
Nagel's work concentrates on the foibles of contemporary legal culture and on how that 
culture perceives American character. As discussed below, Nagel's brief discussion of 
more general features of contemporary political culture is both superficial and flawed. 
4. Only in the last chapter does Nagel clearly indicate that his targets are "progres-
sive intolerance," "progressive censorship," and "reformers." Robert E. Nagel, Judicial 
Power and American Character: Censoring Ourselves in an Anxious Age at 141-43 (Ox-
ford U. Press, 1994) ("Judicial Power"). By comparison, his introduction specifically de-
scribes the failings of contemporary culture in "the first person plural," indicating that 
these failings are features of the general society rather than of any particular group. Id. at 
6. 
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claims and behaviors are responses to questionable conservative 
claims and political behaviors. 
Nagel's discussion of how elite professorial attitudes warped 
the Bork hearings demonstrates the power of his cultural eye-
sight and exposes substantial deficiencies in the contemporary ju-
dicial confirmation process. Rather than side with either Robert 
Bork or his critics, Judicial Power documents the common 
ground that unites academic originalists and non-originalists. 
Some commonalities concern tone. "A very large number of law 
professors," Nagel observes, "criticize uninhibitedly, and gener-
ally write with a degree of authority to which we are not enti-
tled. "s As a result, the stakes in the Bork hearings were 
artificially inflated because the academic participants who en-
gaged in those rhetorical practices too often described their rivals 
as radicals or extremists,6 rather than, as would be more accu-
rate, fellow scholars with theories that seemed, on balance, some-
what inferior to their own. More significantly, Nagel justly 
complains that contemporary academic writing, whether by Bork 
or Laurence Tribe, exhibits "an attachment to theory that subor-
dinates the wisdom of experience and the weight of practice."7 
All parties to the Bork hearing would blithely disregard decades 
of legal precedent to implement their pet theories of judicial re-
view, theories that are rarely grounded in any empirical under-
standing of how judicial decisions actually influence political 
practices.s Indeed, hardly any classic of contemporary constitu-
tion interpretation is informed by the substantial literature in 
political science which discusses the capacity of courts as social 
policymakers.9 
This commitment to arcane legal reasoning has descended 
from the legal professorate to Congress. During the Bork hear-
ings, Nagel points out, representatives aped (and were praised 
5. Id. at 32. 
6. Id. at 31-39. 
7. Id. at 39. 
8. Id. at 33. 
9. See Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social 
Change? (U. of Chi. Press, 1991); Charles A. Johnson and Bradley C. Canon, Judicial 
Policies: Implementation and Impact (CQ Press, 1984); Donald L Horowitz, The Courts 
and Social Policy (Brookings Institute, 1977). Significantly, while Rosenberg reports that 
the "old dead horse of judicial efficacy rears up with a vengeance" whenever he discusses 
The Hollow Hope in legal forums, Gerald N. Rosenberg, Hollow Hopes and Other Aspi-
rations: A Reply to Feeley and McCann, 18 Law and Soc. Inquiry 761, 776 (1993), some 
political scientists complain that "Rosenberg's skeptical position [on judicial power] very 
much flows with, rather than against, prevailing scholarly currents." Michael W. McCann, 
Reform Litigation on Trial, 18 Law and Soc. Inquiry 715, 730 (1993). See Malcolm M. 
Feeley, Hollow Hopes, flypaper and Metaphors, 18 Law and Soc. Inquiry 745, 751 (1993). 
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for aping) the legal academy. Rather than use the confirmation 
process as an opportunity to review "the actual effects of the 
Supreme Court's doctrines and decisions," senators asked 
"learned questions on textualism, judicial restraint, the place of 
stare decisis in constitutional law, and other matters of legal phi-
losophy. "to This learned practice seems astonishing given that 
most voters are probably more concerned with the state of their 
schools or crime in their neighborhoods than with the latest fad 
in semiotics.n 
Nagel explains this strange proclivity of senators to behave 
like academics rather than persons charged with making public 
policy when confirming judicial nominees by noting our political 
culture's tendency to avoid moral discourse. "[M]any Ameri-
cans," he declares, "would have found it unnerving to have their 
representatives openly and directly confront issues of value and 
consequence."12 The rise of such movements as the Christian 
Coalition and feminism, however, suggest that many citizens do 
want elected officials to make fundamental ethical choices. The 
problem representatives face is that, in the absence of any clear 
consensus on what values the people prefer, making any decision 
on abortion, race or related issues may be a political loser. 
Hence, elected officials have special reasons not to "confront is-
sues of value and consequence." By keeping their questions at a 
high level of abstraction, the people's representatives imitate 
statespersons while foisting off to the judiciary the responsibility 
for various political hot potatoes.13 
Nagel brings his discussion of the confirmation process to a 
close by condemning contemporary struggles to control the fed-
eral judiciary for losing all sense of propriety. "During the 
Thomas hearings," he notes, "procedural fairness seemed ... [an] 
almost ridiculous presence patently subordinate to large political 
forces and objectives."t4 Such concerns with the confirmation 
process are widespread. Stephen Carter has similarly observed 
that "nobody is interested in playing by a fair set of rules that 
supersedes the cause of the moment."ts Nagel, however, 
10. Judicial Power at 40-41 (cited in note 4). 
11. See Stephen L. Carter, The Confirmation Mess: Cleaning up the Federal Ap-
pointments Process 57 (Basic Books, 1994). 
12. Judicial Power at 43 (cited in note 4). 
13. This argument is laid out at length in Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian 
Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 Studies in American Political Develop-
ment 35 (1993). 
14. Judicial Power at 27 (cited in note 4). 
15. Carter, The Confirmation Mess at ix (cited in note 11). See generally, Sympo-
sium, Confirmation Controversy: The Selection of a Supreme Court Justice, 84 Nw. U. L. 
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presents a more partisan analysis than Carter. Carter notes "how 
much right and left have come to resemble each other in the 
gleeful and reckless distortions that characterize the efforts to de-
feat challenged nominations."16 Nagel's discussion of the 
Thomas hearings, by comparison, focuses almost exclusively on 
the sins of the opposition. 
Judicial Power correctly labels as a "smear" Senator Howard 
Metzenbaum's unsupported allegation that John Doggett, a wit-
ness for Thomas, was guilty of sexual harassment.17 The book, 
however, fails to acknowledge or even mention the hatchet job 
Senator Arlen Specter did on Anita Hill, Senator Alan Simpson's 
McCarthy-like insinuations of secret evidence discrediting Hill 
or, for that matter, President Bush's dubious claim that Clarence 
Thomas was the best qualified American to fill Thurgood Mar-
shall's seat on the Supreme Court.ls Nagel criticizes Anita Hill 
and her confidants for refusing to reveal her claims of harass-
ment,19 but says nothing about how White House aides almost 
certainly suborned perjury when they advised Thomas to tell the 
Senate that he had never thought about whether abortion is a 
constitutional right.2o 
This one-sided analysis weakens Nagel's critique of the 
Thomas hearings. Supporters of liberal judicial activism when 
confronted with "what about Metzenbaum" are more likely to 
respond "what about Simpson" than acknowledge their responsi-
bility for the present confirmation mess. Only when both sides 
confess error will progress likely be made toning down debates 
over Supreme Court nominees. A more balanced approach 
might also better address the causes of improper practices. Much 
abuse during contemporary confirmation processes may stem 
from real grievances with the other side's performance. Anita 
Hill can be treated unfairly because Clarence Thomas is per-
ceived as being unfairly treated. John Doggett can be treated 
unfairly because Anita Hill is perceived as being unfairly treated. 
More generally, "the sudden stridency in Senate opposition to a 
Rev. 832 (1990); Essays on the Supreme Court Appointments Process, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 
1146 (1988). 
16. Carter, The Confirmation Mess at ix (cited in note 11). 
17. Judicial Power at 25 (cited in note 4). 
18. For a good survey of these and related grievances by supporters of Anita Hill, 
see Toni Morrison, ed., Race-ing Justice, En-gendering Power: Essays on Anita Hil~ Clar-
ence Thomas, and the Construction of Social Reality (Pantheon Books, 1992). See also 
Roger J. Miner, Advice and Consent in Theory and Practice, 41 Am. U. L. Rev. 1075, 1080 
(1992). 
19. Judicial Power at 20-21 (cited in note 4). 
20. See Miner, 41 Am. U. L. Rev. at 1083-84 (cited in note 18). 
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variety of judicial appointments," Carter observes, "is sometimes 
defended as a response to what has been described, fairly or not, 
as an unprecedented effort to pack the court with ideological 
soulmates."2t Nagel's obsession with the transgressions of one 
side in this environment seems more a call for unilateral disarma-
ment than the first steps towards a negotiated settlement. 
Nagel's analysis of the intellectual snobbery underlying lib-
eral judicial activism exhibits the same combination of acute in-
sight and partisan distortion as his treatment of the confirmation 
process. Judicial Power bluntly declares that contemporary legal 
decisions are championed by "elites [who] see the recalcitrance 
of others as a sign of personal deficiencies" and "do not believe 
that their fellows can even face up to problems honestly, let 
alone exercise the civic-spirited discipline necessary to solve 
them."22 Nagel's class-based characterization of American judi-
cial culture extends a distinguished tradition in American polit-
ical thought. More than eighty years ago, Edward Corwin 
declared that "fear of popular majorities ... lies at the very basis 
of the whole system of judicial review";23 Jennifer Nedelsky has 
similarly noted how the Federalist concept of judicial review rests 
on "a general suspicion of the people."24 Remarkably, propo-
nents of liberal activism often acknowledge this "fear of popular 
majorities." Prominent defenders of Roe v. Wade, for example, 
have write under the heading "The Political Process: Not to be 
Trusted. "2s 
Still, few contemporary champions of liberal judicial activ-
ism state their low regard for the constitutional fidelity of the 
average citizen as bluntly as Nagel does, and Nagel's tone is war-
ranted. To reshape schools, election districts, prisons and other 
institutions as courts are doing requires real confidence that one 
is attacking constitutional evils. One's foes, in this world view, 
cannot simply have an alternative vision of the constitutional or-
der. Rather, liberal justices and their supporters must believe 
21. Carter, The Confirnuuion Mess at 72 (cited in note 11). For a superb general 
treatment of the political forces underlying recent confinnation battles, see Mark Silver· 
stein, Judicious Choices: The New Politics of Supreme Coun Confirmations (W.W. Norton 
& Co., 1994). 
22. Judicial Power at 142 (cited in note 4). 
23. Edward S. Corwin, The Supreme Coun and the Founeenth Amendment, 9 Mich. 
L. Rev. 643, 670 {1909). 
24. Jennifer Nedelsky, Private Propeny and the Limits of American Constitutional-
ism 6 (U. of Chi. Press, 1990). 
25. Susan R. Estrich and Kathleen M. Sullivan, Abortion Polilics: Writing for an 
Audience of One, 138 U. Penn. L. Rev. 119, 150 (1989). See also, Carter, The Confirma-
tion Mess at 117 (cited in note 11) (describing "the Court as an important bulwark against 
majority tyranny"). 
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that democratic majorities have no commitment to constitutional 
values and will subvert them if given the opportunity. Much con-
temporary constitutional law, Nagel neatly demonstrates, can be 
explained only by a tacit assumption that "the public and its offi-
cials do not sufficiently appreciate the constitutional values enun-
ciated by the Supreme Court and are-if left to their own 
devises-likely to take unacceptable risks with those values."z6 
The justices, for example, formerly declared informed consent 
laws unconstitutional not because informed consent was a consti-
tutional evil, but because the justices feared such measures would 
be used "to 'intimidate women' and 'to deter' abortions."z7 
Having perceptively identified "fear of popular majorities" 
as the central question of contemporary judicial politics and rhet-
oric, however, Nagel assumes a particular answer. In the political 
universe of Judicial Power, opponents of liberal judicial activism 
can do no wrong; they wish only "to serve the public good. "28 
Racism ceased to be a political factor in American public life 
somewhere around 196(}29 and no reason exists for thinking that 
obscenity laws might result in "widespread timidity and arbitrary 
practices, where valuable ideas and information about sexuality 
never see the light of day."JO Proponents of restrictions against 
homosexuality are not bigots, in Nagel's opinion. Such persons 
are "profoundly uncertain about egalitarian experimentation on 
policies having consequences for such a sensitive and mysterious 
matter as sexual identity."31 Nowhere does Nagel explain how 
such advocates differ from Klansman who are presumably "pro-
foundly uncertain about egalitarian experimentation on policies 
having consequences for such a sensitive and mysterious matter 
as [racial/religious] identity." 
Indeed, opponents of liberal judicial policies need not artic-
ulate reasons when defending their preferred norms. The liberal 
demand that any state coercive policy be justified,32 in Nagel's 
mind, is merely another manifestation "of a prejudice or impulse 
26. Judicial Power at 76 (cited in note 4). 
27. Id. at 74 (discussing Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians, 416 U.S. 
747 (1986)). 
28. ld. at 155. 
29. Id. at 115-19 (discussing Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 
u.s. 430 (1968)). 
30. Id. at 125. 
31. Id. 
32. See cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution 17 (Harv. U. Press, 1993) ("In 
American constitutional law, government must always have a reason for what it does. If 
it is distributing something to one group rather than to another, or depriving someone of 
some good or benefit, it must explain itself"); Ronald Dworkin, lAw's Empire 93-95 
(Harv. U. Press, 1986). 
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widely seen among the intellectual elite-an unexamined bias 
against the inarticulate."33 This disregard for what Nagel labels 
"mute behaviors"34 privileges elite values because less educated 
citizens lack the intellectual sophistication necessary to defend 
their inherited traditions. Nagel recognizes that "mute behav-
ior[s]" can "be either attractive or repellent; they can represent 
deep wisdom or intractable prejudice."Js Unfortunately, Judicial 
Power offers no guidelines for distinguishing between "attrac-
tive" or "repellent" "mute behaviors." 
The case against progressive uses of the judicial power sub-
stantially weakens when one examines more closely than Nagel 
the concerns of those popular majorities that liberal jurists fear. 
Consider Nagel's claim that the court acted as a censor when 
striking down informed consent statutes. Pro-choice advocates, 
he claims (without quoting or citing them), fear that "many preg-
nant females-by instinct or acculturation-were, no doubt, 
highly receptive to reasons for giving birth." This use of the judi-
cial power, therefore, enables proponents of Roe v. Wade36 to 
"protect" "pregnant patients ... from their own minds and incli-
nations." Like traditional censors, Nagel maintains, pro-choice 
forces regard "information [as] dangerous because it is poten-
tially persuasive and ... people should be relieved of the burden 
of deciding whether to be persuaded."37 
A closer look at both informed consent provisions and the 
pro-choice attack on them belies Nagel's naive assertion that 
"the provision of accurate information could have been seen as 
helping to assure knowing, voluntary decisions. "38 Opponents of 
informed consent do not object only to State efforts that discour-
age abortions. They object to state efforts that conscript doctors 
in that state effort to discourage abortions. As the Supreme 
Court noted in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians, 
"forcing the physician or counselor to present the materials and 
the list to the women makes him or her in effect an agent of the 
State in treating the woman and places his or her imprimatur 
upon both the materials and the list."39 More significantly, both 
pro-choice justices and advocates regard informed consent laws 
as " 'a parade of horribles' of dubious validity," and many spe-
33. Judicial Power at 146 (cited in note 4). 
34. ld. at 151. 
35. ld. at 152. 
36. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
37. Judicial Power at 114, 115 (cited in note 4). 
38. ld. at 113. 
39. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians, 476 U.S. at 763. 
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cific requirements as "the antithesis of informed consent."40 
Pennsylvania, for example, required physicians to inform women 
seeking abortions that "detrimental physical and psychological 
effects might occur and were not accurately foreseeable," even 
though medical authorities generally agree that the overwhelm-
ing majority of women who have abortions suffer no significant 
physical or psychological complications.4t Similarly, the Key-
stone State required patients to be informed that "the father was 
required to assist with child support." Yet, as welfare authority 
Deborah Stone notes, 
fathers are generally ordered to pay only a small proportion of 
their income in child support, and the portion declines as the 
man's income rises. Around half of fathers who are ordered 
to make child support payments do not make them after the 
first year or so, and courts do nothing about enforcing the 
awards.42 
As the Court politely noted in Thornburgh, "theoretical financial 
responsibility often does not equate with fulfillment. "43 
In short, from the perspective of pro-choice justices and ad-
vocates, proponents of so-called "informed consent" are interfer-
ing with "knowing, voluntary decisions" by "conveying . . . 
misleading and factually inaccurate impression[s]."44 Pro-life ad-
vocates do have anecdotes of women being pressured into abor-
tions through presentation of misleading information.4s Still, 
rather than accept one side's interpretation of itself, as Nagel 
does, a realist investigation of informed consent laws would ex-
amine how accurate each party's claims are and how perceptions 
of abuse by one side lead to actions that the other side regards as 
abusive. Who the censor is depends on how informed "informed 
consent" laws are. 
40. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. 7fJl, 764 (quoting Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 
Inc. v. City of Akron, 462 U.S. 416, 445 (1983)). 
41. See Donald N. Bersoff, Brief of Amicus Curiae American Psychological Associa-
tion in Support of Appellees, Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians, 476 U.S. 
747 n.9 (1986). 
42. Deborah A. Stone, Sex, Lies and the Scarlet Letter, 22 The American Prospect 
105, 108 (Spring 1995). 
43. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 763. 
44. Bersoff, Brief of Amicus Curiae at n.12 (cited in note 41). 
45. See David C. Reardon, Aborted Women: Silent No More 30-31 (Crossway 
Books, 1987). No study, however, has found that coerced abortion is a major social prob-
lem. Very few women regret their abortions upon reflection, and most women who have 
abortions become more sympathetic to pro-choice positions. See E. Freeman, Influence 
of Personality Attributes on Abortion Experiences, 47 Am. Jour. of Orthopsychiatry ?03, 
506 (1977); Donald Granberg, The Abortion Activists, 13 Family Planning Perspectives 
157, 161 (1981). 
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Nagel concludes Judicial Power with a call for democratic 
"renewal."46 To revitalize our republic, he proclaims, "society at 
large" must overcome "doubts about itself and its past" that lead 
the citizenry to "participate[ ] willingly in its own Uudicial] cen-
sorship."47 Repressing these doubts, unfortunately, apparently 
requires that we either deny the existence of past repressive prac-
tices that scholars have documented played a vital role in Ameri-
can constitutional development4s or insist that no vestiges of 
those practices exist at present.49 Acknowledging past injustices, 
on the other hand, might force Americans to recognize that our 
society is capable of systemically violating fundamental human 
and constitutional rights, and that such abuses may still occur at 
present. Moreover, the moral certainty Nagel would foster may 
not be conducive to a healthy republic. Anthony Comstock, in 
his view, seems the ideal democratic citizen, along with John 
Brown, Joe McCarthy and Pat Buchanan, none of whom ever 
expressed doubt about their essential political commitments. A 
more realistic view of democracy suggests that popular govern-
ment functions best when most citizens treat their fellows with 
equal concern and respect and do not take opposing and unyield-
ing positions on matters of public importance.so If abortion and 
affirmative action are examples of the present state of political 
debate, the polity might benefit from less certainty and more 
doubt. 
46. Judicial Power at 156 (cited in note 4). 
47. Id. at 154. 
48. See Rogers M. Smith, Beyond Tocqueville, Myrdal, and Hartz: The Multiple Tra-
ditions in America, 81 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 549 (1993). 
49. See notes 28-31 and the relevant text. 
50. See Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America 85-86 (Harcourt Brace Jova-
novich, 1955); Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory 15-84 (U. of Chi. Press, 
1956). 
